249 N.W.2d 458
No. 46608.Supreme Court of Minnesota.
January 7, 1977.
Appeal and error — appeal by party not aggrieved.
Proceeding in the Hennepin County District Court to enjoin defendant from violating a cease and desist order issued by plaintiff. The court, Harold Kalina, Judge, found that the statutory authority for plaintiff to regulate defendant was unconstitutional and that plaintiff did not have the power to issue the order. Defendant appealed from the judgment entered. Appeal dismissed.
Hall Sjoquist, Alfred E. Hall, Grannis Grannis, Vance B. Grannis, and Roger N. Knutson, for appellant.
Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufman Doty and David S. Doty, for respondent.
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Considered and decided by the court en banc.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of part of Minn. St. 473.413, subd. 6.[1] Defendant contends the entire subdivision should be declared unconstitutional.[2] We dismiss the appeal.
Plaintiff, Twin Cities Metropolitan Public Transit Area, is a public corporation and political subdivision of the state, which acts by and through its governing body, the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC). It owns and operates a public transit system which serves more than 50 percent of the persons using public transit systems in the area. Defendant,
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George C. Holter, is an individual who owns and operates the Richfield Bus Company, a public transit system.
By authority of § 473.413, subd. 6, plaintiff is vested with regulatory powers, as enumerated in Minn. St. c. 221, over all public transit systems in the area. Pursuant to this authority, plaintiff issued a cease and desist order against defendant. Plaintiff initiated the present action to enjoin violation of its order by defendant, who defended on the grounds that Minn. St. 473.413, subd. 6, is unconstitutional.
The trial court agreed that, in so far as the statute authorizes plaintiff to regulate other public transit systems in the area, it denies defendant the right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal in contravention of the due process clause of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV and Minn. Const. art. 1. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in so far as it authorizes the MTC to regulate itself. Defendant appeals from the judgment upholding that part of § 473.413, subd. 6.
A party who is not aggrieved by a judgment may not appeal from it. See, In re Trust in Estate of Everett, 263 Minn. 398, 116 N.W.2d 601 (1962); Singer v. Allied Factors, Inc. 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378 (1944).[3] In In re Trust in Estate of Everett, 263 Minn. 398, 401, 116 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1962), we quoted from 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 183b(1), p. 561, as follows:
“* * * To render a party aggrieved by an order, so as to entitle him to appeal therefrom, the right invaded must be immediate, not merely some possible, remote consequence, or mere possibility
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arising from some unknown and future contingency; * * *.”
Defendant is not aggrieved by that part of the judgment from which he appeals. Defendant prevailed below because the cease and desist order against him was denied enforcement. Dismissal of this appeal is neither a final adjudication of the constitutional issues ruled upon in the trial court nor a bar to an action by defendant in the event any act of self-regulation by the MTC were to result in an impermissible impairment of the rights of this defendant.
Costs and disbursements are disallowed to either party.
Appeal dismissed.