STATE v. MINOR, CX-97-1665 (Minn.App. 2-3-1998)

No. CX-97-1665.Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Filed February 3, 1998.

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

Appeal from the District Court, Stearns County, File No. K4-96-4605.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, and Jan Peterson, St. Cloud (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lyonel Norris, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Forsberg, Judge.[*]

UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CRIPPEN, Judge

Appealing from his sentence, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his claim for 20 days of jail credit for time he served prior to sentencing. We reverse.

FACTS
After his case was turned over to the city attorney on November 20, 1996, appellant was convicted of issuing worthless checks in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.535, subds. 2, 2a(a)(1), 2a(b) (1996). He was incarcerated on unrelated charges for 2 days in December 1996 and for 18 days in January 1997. It is undisputed that there was probable cause to charge appellant by the time he was detained in December. Moreover, after appellant moved for relief, the state, which filed no brief to this court, conceded to the trial court that appellant was entitled to credit for the 18 days in January.

DECISION
The decision to grant jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court. State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn.App. 1987), reviewdenied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988). Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03, subd. 4(b) and Minn. Sent. Guidelines III.C both require credit for “all time spent in custody.” Initially, the focus was on time spent in custody “in connection with” the offense as found in Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03, subd. 4(b). That gave way to decisions that recognized the risk that jail time credits be taken from a defendant by the prosecutorial choice to delay filing of new charges. See, e.g. State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374-75
(Minn. 1989) (holding that the length of a sentence should not turn on matters such as the charging process that prosecutors can manipulate to destroy jail credit entitlements). The circumstances here are not unlike those in Folley. Accordingly, we reverse the decision denying appellant credit for the 20 days he was incarcerated.

Reversed.