ADAMS v. CITY OF MOORHEAD, C5-95-2704 (Minn.App. 7-9-1996)

REEVA L. ADAMS, Appellant, v. CITY OF MOORHEAD, ET AL., Respondents.

No. C5-95-2704.Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Filed July 9, 1996.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

Appeal from the District Court, Clay County, File No. C1-95-865.

Leland F. Hagen, Lee Hagen Law Office, Ltd., (for appellant).

Ellen A. Longfellow, Carla J. Heyl, (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Holtan, Judge.[*]

[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge.

Reeva Adams appeals the summary judgment granted to the City of Moorhead (the City). The district court held that respondent city was immune from Adams’s claim for injuries incurred while using the city’s recreational facility. Because we conclude that Adams’s claim fits squarely within those claims for which the statute confers immunity, we affirm.

DECISION
Adams brought this action against the City to recover for damages sustained when she tripped and fell while walking on the track in Moorhead’s Sports Center. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was immune under the parks and recreation statute, Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e (1992).[1]

Whether the statute applies to confer immunity is a question of law, subject to de novo review. A reviewing court is not bound by and need not give deference to a district court’s decision on a purely legal issue.Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984); see also Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 1989) (whether discretionary immunity applies is a question of law); Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. 1988) (existence of qualified immunity is a question of law).

Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e, states that the municipal tort liability act does not apply to [a]ny claim based upon the construction, operation, or maintenance of any property owned or leased by the municipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park, as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services * * *.[2]

Adams’s claim is based on the allegedly negligent maintenance of city-owned property owned by the city that is intended and permitted to be used for the recreational services. Therefore the tort liability act does not apply, and respondent is immune. The statute was interpreted inMartin v. Spirit Mountain Recreation Area Auth., 527 N.W.2d 167
(Minn.App. 1995), review denied (Minn. March 29, 1995).

Thus, the property was intended, and is permitted, to be used for the provision of recreational services. [T]he plain language of Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e provides [the municipality] protection against [the injured party’s] claims.

Id. at 169. The Sports Center was intended, and is permitted, to be used for recreational purposes: the plain language of the statute confers immunity.

Adams argues that the exception to tort liability does not apply when the recreational facility is also used for other purposes. Adams offers no authority that supports this view, and we decline to address the issue in a case where the injury clearly occurred during recreational use of a portion of the facility intended for recreational purposes. Given the facts of this case, we hold that Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e, clearly confers immunity.

Affirmed.

[1] The City also moved for summary judgment under the discretionary acts statute and on the ground that Adams failed to show any causal connection between the City’s alleged negligence and her injuries. The district court did not address either of these claims, but the City nevertheless filed a notice of review as if they had been denied. Because they were not considered by the district court, this court does not review them. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). See alsoMartinez v. Minnesota Zoological Gardens, 526 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn.App. 1995) (noting that “[o]ur resolution of this [immunity] issue renders the state’s remaining arguments moot”).

[2] The statute also states that it does not confer immunity for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to maintain an action, but Adams concedes that she does not meet the trespasser standard.